As temperatures rose sharply in May, China carried out four “joint combat readiness patrols” around Taiwan, on May 1, 6, 19, and 25. When compared with similar activity in recent years, this high frequency of military operations is unusual. It also suggests that the assumption that a recent decline in the number of PLA sorties around Taiwan necessarily indicates a reduced threat may not fully correspond to the current security environment in the Taiwan Strait.
This pattern should also be read alongside recent media reports that more than 100 Chinese vessels had been deployed around the First Island Chain. Taken together, these developments show that although China did not launch a large-scale, Taiwan-specific military exercise after the Trump-Xi meeting, it has instead relied on frequent joint combat readiness patrols and increased naval deployments. These appear to be service-specific exercises led primarily by the PLAN.
A similar pattern was seen in early December 2025, when China conducted a navy-centered exercise involving nearly 100 vessels operating in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea within the First Island Chain. This may indicate a semiannual service-level exercise by the PLAN. That said, while the scale of the fleet deployment was large, it did not yet amount to a cross-service joint operation.
Recent PLA activity suggests that although the Eastern Theater Command increased the frequency of joint combat readiness patrols directed at Taiwan in May, these actions did not escalate to the level of large-scale Taiwan-focused exercises such as Joint Sword or Strait Thunder. This indicates that while Beijing continues to normalize military pressure against Taiwan, it does not necessarily seek to sharply raise tensions in the Taiwan Strait at this stage.
Instead, from Beijing’s perspective, the East China Sea and South China Sea may now be higher priorities for military deterrence than the Taiwan Strait itself. Following the Philippines-U.S. Balikatan exercises, the United States’ effort to strengthen Indo-Pacific defense cooperation through Japan and the Philippines has become increasingly clear. In response, China is using aircraft carrier deployments beyond the First Island Chain as a means of demonstrating its ability to conduct long-range blue-water operations.
Japan, for example, reported that at noon on May 25, the Liaoning carrier strike group appeared in waters roughly 880 kilometers southwest of Okinotorishima. In addition to the Liaoning, the formation included the Type 055 large destroyer Wuxi, the Type 052D destroyer Kaifeng, the Type 054B frigate Luohe, and the Type 901 fast combat support ship Hulunhu. The presence of the Type 901 support ship is particularly noteworthy, as it suggests preparations for an extended far-seas mission.
This deployment should also be viewed together with the Type 075 amphibious assault ship formation that transited the Miyako Strait on May 22. It is possible that the PLAN is conducting training similar to the “far-seas and distant-area” realistic combat exercises carried out by the Type 075 and the Shandong aircraft carrier in September 2024. This time, however, the Liaoning appears to be the carrier platform responsible for the relevant training missions.
To be sure, PLA naval activity in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Western Pacific remains geographically distant from Taiwan. But that does not mean Taiwan can afford to feel secure. Beyond joint combat readiness patrols, Beijing is likely to make greater use of the China Coast Guard as a first-line force to pressure Taiwan. These actions may be accompanied by cognitive warfare designed to weaken Taiwan’s psychological resilience from within. After all, even the strongest city wall is most vulnerable when breached from the inside.
How Taiwan responds to China’s successive waves of hybrid warfare pressure will therefore become one of its most important security challenges.
