Donald Trump’s Tariff Re-Do in Southeast Asia

Last year, the United States imposed sweeping tariffs on its trade partners worldwide, including those in Southeast Asia. The tariffs, which went as high as 49 percent, were based largely on the size of each country’s bilateral trade surplus with the United States. Really big exporters, like Thailand and Vietnam, faced stiff tariffs.

Indonesia and Malaysia quickly agreed to lopsided reciprocal trade agreements with the U.S. to get the tariffs lowered to under 20 percent. That may have been hasty as the deals contain numerous provisions that are seemingly impossible to enforce.  In any case, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the tariffs in February.

Trump’s love of tariffs has not been deterred, however, and the administration soon launched a wave of investigations under the authority of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. This gives the U.S. Trade Representative broad powers to impose tariffs if they conclude that trade partners are engaging in unfair practices or using forced labor. The results are in on the forced labor probe, and the administration has concluded that 60 countries are in violation of Section 301. Those found to be in violation are subject to new tariffs of between 10 and 12.5 percent.

Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand are among those being tariffed at the higher rate. Indonesia and Malaysia, which have conveniently already signed reciprocal trade agreements with the U.S., are subject to the lower 10 percent rate. Of course, the official explanation is not being received well. Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan noted that there was “no technical or economic basis” for the tariffs, and that the U.S. actually runs a trade surplus with Singapore.

One could be forgiven for thinking the new round of Section 301 investigations is merely a thin pretext for re-tariffing trade partners after the first round of tariffs were struck down by the Supreme Court. But the Singapore case is worth unpacking, as it underscores just how complex international trade and investment networks are and the extent to which the new round of tariffs seems to miss the point entirely.

In April 2025, Singapore was hit with a 10 percent tariff by the Trump Administration. This was relatively light, compared to higher punitive tariffs levied on countries like Thailand and Vietnam that run large bilateral trade surpluses with the United States. Singapore’s new 12.5 percent tariff under Section 301 is therefore higher than the previous one. It is even more peculiar because Singapore runs a trade deficit with the U.S., meaning Singapore imports more goods and services from the U.S. than it exports, which is precisely what the U.S. claimed it wanted in the first place.

Singapore’s total exports of goods to the U.S., including re-exported goods, reached $54 billion in 2025 (at current exchange rates). During that same time period, Singapore imported from the U.S. $54.6 billion worth of goods. That means they ran a slight deficit in tradable goods. When you add services to the calculation, the deficit widens considerably. In 2025, Singapore imported $95 billion worth of services from American firms, while exporting just $50 billion. This means Singapore is actually running a total trade deficit with the United States of about $45.5 billion.

The Trump administration is tariffing a long-time ally that runs a large bilateral trade deficit with the United States, something the administration claims it wants countries to do more of. Beyond trade, Singapore is also a crucial destination for U.S. investment in the region. American investors and firms like to set up entities in Singapore because of its strong governance system and attractive tax rates. They then use it as an entry point for reinvesting around the region. As of 2024, the cumulative stock of U.S. direct investment in Singapore was recorded at $608 billion.

Trump’s first attempt to tariff the region was knocked down by the Supreme Court, but not before several countries signed lopsided trade agreements. Those that didn’t, like Singapore, are now being hit with a second wave of tariffs using rather thin justifications under Section 301. The new tariffs seemingly ignore the fact that Singapore has a bilateral trade deficit with the United States, and also serves as a key entry point for U.S. investment in the region.

At this point we have become largely inured to the vagaries of trade policy in the Trump administration. But at some point, one has to believe that long-time allies and the networks of trade and investment that flow through them and which have historically benefited the U.S. are going to be permanently undermined and damaged the longer they are subjected to such whimsical policy-making. And it may not be easy to reconstruct them in the future.